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This study tracks the remediation history and redevelopment on three brownfield sites in 
Baltimore, Maryland.  The sites are Camden Crossing, Highland Marine Terminal, and Crown, 
Cork, and Seal.  The first project, Camden Crossing, promises to turn previously industrial 
property into a town house development.  Highland Marine Terminal and Crown, Cork, and Seal 
were industrial sites transformed into warehouse space.  The proposed residential, Camden 
Crossing, project has met with continuous impediments and delays, and is now running more 
than eight years behind schedule.  The two industry to warehouse sites can be characterized as 
successful, with profitable enterprises now operating on both.  The factors that appear to 
compress risk and contribute to successful brownfield  redevelopments are continuous industrial 
use, a strong market for the final use, and quick movement through the Phase I and Phase II 
testing, Maryland Department of the Environment approvals, and reuse.  The continuous 
industrial use means that cleanup standards are not as stringent as for residential use, thereby 
speeding cleanup and lowering remdiation costs.  Moreover, an uncertain market for the final 
product increases risk.  For example, the warehouse market in Baltimore is much stronger than 
the residential market.  The weak residential market in combination with stringent cleanup 
standards undermines the profitability of Camden Crossing.  Finally, the delays in Camden 
Crossing have both resulted in and been further aggravated by changes in the Maryland 
Department of the Environment staff.  Over the eight years the project has been under 
discussion, the Maryland Department of the Environment has revised and made cleanup 
standards more strict. 
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What Makes for a Successful Brownfield Redevelopment? 
Three Baltimore Case Studies2 
 
A comparison of three brownfield development projects in Baltimore, Maryland casts 
light on the characteristics that make for successful public involvement and redevelopment of 
brownfield sites.  Only three years from land purchase to profitable operation, officials from the 
City of Baltimore and the State of Maryland consider the Highland Marine Terminal (HMT) a 
model brownfield redevelopment project.  The Crown Cork and Seal project was completed in 
even less time.  In contrast, Camden Crossing is a brownfield redevelopment project that has 
confronted a series of obstacles.  The project is on its second developer and running more than 
eight years behind schedule with no end in site.   Highland Marine Terminal and Camden 
Crossing involved government subsidy.  Crown, Cork, and Seal is a completely private venture.  
This paper introduces the three sites, their reuse plans, their environmental histories, and their 
redevelopment histories.   By identifying similarities and differences, I draws lessons about the 




Camden Crossing is the latest incarnation of a public/private brownfield development in 
Southwest Baltimore.  The Camden Crossing project promises to turn a once contaminated site 
into middle-income housing.  The property sat vacant when the Koppers Co. closed their 
                                                 
2The author is grateful to the Lincoln Land Institute in Cambridge, MA for financial 
support and to Brad Boese, Ann Piesen and Samantha Brown who provide research assistance.  
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operation in 1986 until 1993, when the City purchased the site.  The Baltimore branch of the 
Koppers Co. was a metalworking, chemical, construction, and engineering business that made 
carriages for rail cars, rail engines, cannons and smaller munitions.  The City agreed to clean it, 
and in a competitive bid round exclusive to housing proposals, the City, awarded the project to 
Ryland Homes, who teamed with Otis Warren, a local builder.  In 1997, the Ryland/Warren team 
backed out of the project, after the discovery of additional contamination, underground tanks and 
buried foundations and possibly uncertainty about the market for middle income housing at this 
location..  The following year, the City awarded the project to a new developer, Metroventures.  
Metroventures received the contract based on their proposal for a 144 residential townhouse 
development catering to young professionals.  This project is still in negotiation and more than 
four years behind  Metroventures’s most original timetable. 
 
The Site 
The proposed Camden Crossing development lies between McHenry, Scott, Poppleton, 
and Clifford Streets in Southwest Baltimore.3   The eight-acre site is in walking distance of the 
Inner Harbor, B&O railroad museum, Camden Yards baseball stadium and Raven’s football 
stadium.   The site adjoins Barre Circle, a district of century-old rowhouses “homesteaded” in 
the 1970s; Roundhouse Square, with 44 houses built in 1988; and a cluster of 10 houses built 
along Pratt Street since 1987.   The restored rowhouses in Barre Circle sell for about $85,000 to 
$100,000.  The townhouses at Roundhouse Square sold from between $95,000 to $115,000, and 
                                                 
3Specifically the parcels include 301 Parkin Steet, 250, 393, and 400 Scott Steet, 877 
Ramsey Street, 311, 313, 315, 317, and 325 S. Poppleton Street, 842, 850, 852 and 854 Ryan 
Street, and 815, 819, and 823 McHenry Street. 
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the houses on Pratt Street originally sold for $90,000 (McCabe 1995).  Other houses in the 
neighborhood sell for less.  Most rowhouses sold for $30,000 to $40,000 in the 1980s, and sold 
for as little as $15,000 in the 1990s (McCabe 1995). 
The site is located in Pigtown, which takes its name from the days when pigs were herded 
 through the streets to slaughter.  Pigtown is a neighborhood in decline, with all of the attendant 
social problems, including; housing abandonment, high crime rates, high rates of poverty, and a 
shift from homeowners to renters.  
The Koppers parcel is in a Federal Empowerment Zone.  Thus home purchasers would be 
eligible for a number of subsidies, including the City’s Housing Ventures Fund, which provides 
$5,000 towards the down payment or settlement, and the State’s Community Development 
Administration low-interest mortgage program.  Some buyers may also qualify for incentives 
through the City Home Ownerships Institute’s “Live Near Your Work Program”, and Settlement 
Expense Loan Program. 
The site is also in the Washington Village Urban Renewal Area, which gave the city the 
power to acquire the site through eminent domain.  Koppers, however, agreed to sell the property 
to the city prior to the condemnation process.  The City purchased the property from Koppers for 
$1.5 million.  
 
Environmental History 
The Kopper’s Co. was the largest land owner on the site in 1986 and property has been 
used for industrial purposes since the mid 1800s.   Portions of the redevelopment site have also 
been occupied by residents, a hay and corn warehouse, a barrel dealer, a rag dealer, a beverage 
distributor, a recycled paper dealer, wood storage, and a roofing business(Sanborn Maps 1890, 
1915, 1953).  In 1992, prior to the City’s purchase of the land, Spotts, Stephens, and McCoy Inc. 
(SSM) was hired by the City to conduct a Phase I test on all 13 properties that eventually became 
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Camden Crossing.  At this time, the Phase I included a visual review of existing conditions and 
an examination of the historical record, but no soil sampling and no consideration of the 
proposed use.4 
SSM found asbestos in the building 5, rags with oil, a paint booth, and three internal and 
three external transformers and flourescent lights suspected of containing Polychlorinated 
Biphenyls (PCBs).6  Neither the transformers nor the flourescent lights were damaged.  On the 
basis of the Phase I, the City purchased the site. 
The Baltimore Department of Housing and Community Development (BDHCD) 
contracted with SSM, who subcontracted with Clean Harbors for asbestos removal.  When SSM 
and Clean Harbors went in to remove the asbestos in 1993, they discovered that in the interim 
since the original environmental assessment, vandals had entered the site and building and gutted 
the flourescent lights and transformers for copper.  Vandals spilled roughly 400 to 1,000 gallons 
                                                 
4  This 1992 study wouldn’t satisfy current U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
standards.  The EPA passed more comprehensive guidelines in Guidance for Performing Site 
Inspection Under CERCLA: Interim Final, September 1992.  
5 Asbestos wraps on pipes and in roofing materials. 
6  PCBs are used to transmit heat and as a plasticiser.  PCBs are a suspected carcinogen if 
touched, breathed in, swallowed, etc. 
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of oil contaminated with PCBs.7   SSM alerted the City. 
                                                 
7  One lesson from this case is that once the government takes ownership of a property, 
they must maintain the same level of security as a private firm.  In spite of seven years of 
vacancy, the Kopper’s Company maintained security on the site.  In the short six-month period 
between City purchase and the initiation of clean up, the lapse in security resulted in more than 
$1 million in additional remediation expense. 
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In late summer, 19938, the City contracted with SSM to evaluate the extent of the 
damage.  With three-fourths feet of trash inside the Parkin Street building, the consultants had 
difficulty mapping the trail of the PCB contamination.  Car and truck bodies, abandoned oil 
drums, trash, wire, and plumbing covered the building floor.  SSM wiped and sampled the debris 
to determine the path and extent of the PCBs contamination.  They located and charted the PCB 
trail, characterized both clean or contaminated garbage.   
During the original Phase I testing, SSM observed a paint booth.  Additional sampling 
was done at this time to measure paint-associated pollution. Around the paint booth, they found 
lead and Cadmium.  The worst PCB contamination was found in a two foot by five foot pit, four 
feet deep on the first floor of  the Parkin Street building.  The floor and ultimately the building 
was removed, and the ground was cleaned down 12" to 14", to a clay lens where no further PCBs 
were detected.   SSM scrubbed PCBs until there was no trace, both inside the building and out of 
doors almost to McHenry street.  Cleanup stopped short of McHenry Street, from fear of hitting 
the gas trunk line that ran underneath the road bed.  The PCBs were traced to McHenry St. 
through a 4" drain that ran from the pit to the storm drain in the street.  At the street there was 
enough PCBs to be concerned, however at the outlet to the harbor, where the drains emptied, the 
levels were negligible.  Altogether, the city paid $1.5 million for cleanup of the PCB, lead, and 
cadmium contaminants. 
The protocol for testing after a cleanup is to set up a grid and randomly select spots on 
the grid for testing.  After testing, there was no evidence of PCBs and the site was approved for 
demolition.  As a result, the construction rubble was disposed of as regular construction debris, 
not as hazardous waste.  P&J Engineering was hired to carry out demolition, which raised which 
a whole new set of problems. 
                                                 
8  Tom Russ was employed by SSM on the project in October, 1993. 
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 The construction company had a fixed fee to clear the site to 6 feet below grade and 
remove any debris.  During the demolition, now in early 1996, crews found huge concrete 
footers and slabs that supported both the old factories and  provided foundations for 19th century 
forge hammers.  The plant had housed two five ton hammers and one ten ton hammer.  In 
addition to the concrete foundation, contractors found underground storage tanks and a series of 
underground water, electrical, steam and fuel oil pipes.  Much of this was impossible to remove 
and more than six feet below the surface.  The crews also found small quantities of oil, toxic 
fluids, and soil contaminated with lead.  The level of toxic contamination was not serious.  The 
major anticipated costs now were with the removal of unknown concrete structures below the 
surface (Mirabella 1996). 
Concrete hardens with age – and turns blue. According to Tom Russ, an environmental 
scientist with SSM, “the foundations and slabs were hard and blue.”  Furthermore, the contractor 
ran into two unanticipated concrete vaults, each four feet deep, and a concrete box twenty feet 
deep with a ladder.9  As agreed, the contractor cleared the site to six feet below grade and 
removed the PCB-cleaned rubble.   The smaller vaults were removed and the larger one was 
filled in.   Additional contamination in the form of  a grey/yellow slag high in lead was found in 
the back fill at the vaults.  The contractor collected the slag, disposed of it, and re-tested – levels 
were close to zero.  The contractor also attempted to clean the paint, but could not eliminate it 
entirely.  The engineers removed a foot of soil, eliminating the lead and cadmium from around 
the paint booth. 
P&J Engineering never completed the demolition.  They were awarded the project for a 
flat fee and when the problems escalated the company couldn’t afford to finish the job.  In 
addition to the remaining foundations, oil remained in the ground, caused by storage tank 
                                                 
9  The vaults were clean, except for uncontaminated gravel in the smaller vaults. 
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leakage.   Because of the extensive debris below the six foot clearance and the expectation of  
continued settling on the property, a decision was made that any development would be pad on 
grade.   The agreement with the developer is that there will be no basements because of the 
foundations still remaining below the six foot line. 
In 1997, the site was given a letter of “No Further Action” (NFA).  This was prior to the 
creation of the State of Maryland, Voluntary Cleanup Program, and the Brownfield Pilot 
Program.  This 1997 NFA letter does not carry the authority of law.  It is a policy letter and 
provides no legal protection from owner liability.  In 1997, the City entered the site into the State 
of Maryland’s, Voluntary cleanup program, designed to give the developer legal non-culpable 
status.  For reasons described below,  the developer has still not received release from future 
legal liability. 
In 1997, SSM followed the standard grid testing protocol.  SSM tested some points on 
the grid and the Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE) sampled others.  SSM found 
no PCBs.  However, the MDE reported “ concerns about...PCBs that were present at certain 
locations on the site”.  MDE also reported concern about Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons 
(PAHs).  PAHs are an organic compound that can result from fires or oil and gas decomposition 
(MDE 2001).  The levels posed no danger to adults, but were elevated high enough to be harmful 
to children with long term exposure.  These levels were high enough to concern MDE officials.   
On April 17, 1997, the City received a letter from MDE confirming that MDE would accept a 
“three foot buffer of clean fill ...placed between existing on-site soils and finished grade in areas 
where exposure may take place, such as open space and residential yards west of Parkin Street” 
(Graham 1999, p. 3).   It was at this point that the Ryland/Warren team backed out of the project.  
 
Redevelopment History 
1900 to 1993; Industrial Years and Abandonment 
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From 1901 to 1915, the site belonged to Bartlett-Hayward and Co., Engineers and 
Founders, black smithing operation.  In 1953, it was transferred to Koppers Company, a division 
of Bartlett-Hayward.  Currently, the company is Koppers Industries, a Pittsburgh based 
chemical, carbon materials, railroad, and utility products company.  Koppers vacated their 
Baltimore location in 1986 and the property became an eyesore after a nine-alarm fire in 1986 
consumed the old Koppers Co. warehouse and ripped through nearby homes.  Also located at the 
site were Boston Metal Co., which sold and repaired marine and industrial equipment, Harbor 
Iron Works, and a rag factory.  The site sat vacant, overgrown, and littered with splintered 
boards, mattresses and the grey metal ruins of a factory from 1986 until 1993 (Mirabella 1994a).  
 
1993:  City Purchase 
 The City purchased the parcel for $1.5 million in 1993, and put the concept of a 
residential development on the site out for bid in November of 1993.  The City agreed to clean 
the site, setting aside $1.4 million for this purpose.  Residents of Pigtown, the surrounding 
community, worked with City officials to establish guidelines for land use.  Residents lobbied 
hard for a residential development that would bring new customers and new life to the depressed 
commercial development along Washington Boulevard and would infuse new energy into a 
neighborhood teetering on poverty.  While some residents would have preferred jobs on the site, 
a plan for housing was adopted.  “We are excited we won’t have a vacant lot there.” said Doc 
Godwin, president of Hearts of Pigtown, “But we’re hoping these people will interact with us 
rather than jump in their cars and go shopping other places.  We want them to support the 
businesses and mom-and-pop stores” (Baltimore Sun 1994).   The City’s goal is to expand the 
middle income tax base in the city, creating an affordable urban neighborhood that provides an 
alternative to the higher priced housing being built on Federal Hill and Fells Point.  
Three developers competed for the right to develop the sites, Ryland Homes and Otis 
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Warren Development Inc., Worthington Properties of Baltimore, and Rodwell Industries Inc. of 
Washington.  All three proposals included middle income housing in the $100,000 per unit 
range. Development rights were awarded to Ryland/Warren joint ventures because of Ryland’s 
financial strength and marketing ability (Mirabella 1994b).  Ryland Homes is the nation’s third 
largest homebuilder and this was the company’s first major plunge into the Baltimore City 
housing market.  
 
1994-1998:  Ryland Homes’ Barre Station 
Ryland’s development, named Barre Station, proposed townhouses with garages, 
optional fireplaces, decks, and other amenities desired by middle income buyers. As described 
above, City contractors cleaned up the PCB contamination, but during the early 1996 demolition, 
contractors discovered underground concrete slabs, columns, and tanks on the site, delaying 
construction plans for more than a year (MDE 1996).  In January of 1997, Ryland and Warren 
announced they would break ground for the $11 million project in April of that year.  Prices 
were announced to range from $80,000 to $130,000 per unit, and there were 101 to 114 units 
anticipated (Wheeler 1997).  The April target date passed, and the project did not begin as 
predicted.  
The City had spent $1.9 million in environmental clean up, and thought they were living 
up to their agreement.  City officials believe they did all they could to alleviate Ryland/Warren’s 
environmental concerns.  Still, worries over environmental liability weighed heavily in Ryland’s 
decision to back out.  According to Jim Joyce of Ryland Homes, environmental conditions were 
a critical factor in Ryland/Warren’s decision to abandon the project, 
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 “If Koppers caused the [environmental] problem, obviously [I] am not liable.  If the city 
caused a problem in their demolition, [I am] not liable.  But what if there is a condition that by 
moving that dirt around on that site, once it had been adequately buried, and now bring it to the 
surface while I had title, now maybe I’m liable”. “And you know the reality is, if a suit got 
filed...who would you sue first?  The public company, with the biggest name and the deepest 
pockets..in this case it would be Ryland”(Nubgart 1998).  
 
Ryland officials were also uncertain about the level of protection offered by the State of 
Maryland’s letter of NFA.  In March of 1998, Ryland/Warren decided to abandon their plans to 
redevelop this site and released their option to purchase the site.  
As part of their decision to abandon the Barre Station development, James Joyce from 
Ryland homes claimed “The site still contains concrete footers from the Koppers plant like 
Stonehenge” (Nubgart 1998).  While city officials and the project’s environmental consultant 
proposed just building on the top of the them, without basements, Joyce said they couldn’t be 
buried and removing them would add between $500,000 to $800,000 to development costs, 
raising home prices from $105,000 to $125,000 to $130,000. (Nubgart 1998).  According to the 
Baltimore Sun, after four years and hundreds of thousands of dollars, the two developers decided 
that project wouldn’t be profitable and that it was impossible to be certain that the property was 
environmentally clean (Nubgart 1998). 
Aside from the environmental uncertainties, Ryland developers noticed that houses in 
adjacent neighborhoods, such as Barre Circle, were selling in the $79,000 range with sluggish 
sales activity.  That began to convince them that even at $100,000, Barre Station would be a 
tough sell (Nubart 1998).  Thus, most likely, worries about the financial returns played a role in 
the decision to abandon the project after more than four years of work.   
A third factor in the back out may have been the transfer of key Ryland personnel.  The 
original team, who was familiar with the risks of central city re-development, left and the 
replacement Ryland official had been a suburban developer.  He was less comfortable with the 
risks of a central city development.  Thus a change in management may have also played role in 
the decision to give up on the project.   
Otis Warren was skeptical another developer could succeed stating,  
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 “Why would we spend a couple hundred thousand dollars and four 
years of our lives and this is what we do...just walk away?  It 
doesn’t make sense...Maybe someone else can afford to take that 
risk.  People jump out of airplanes, but I don’t” (Nubgart 1998). 
 
Some observers blamed the city.  “The City has reneged on its promise to the developers 
to deliver the land buildable” according Joseph Brown Jr., a board  member of an adjacent  local 
homeowner’s association and a neighbor to the site (Klein 1998). 
 
1998 - Present:  Metroventures’ Camden Crossing 
Although early estimates were that four developers would submit proposals in the City’s 
new round of bid requests (Gunts 1998a and b), only two proposals were received.  One from the 
Baltimore Streetcar Museum on Falls Road, who proposed to relocate to the parcel so it could 
promote itself and the B&O Railroad Museum as one destination for rail enthusiasts.  The 
second bid came from Metroventures, proposing “Scotts Landing”, an $18.6 million community 
with 144 townhouses priced at no more than $105,000.   The Streetcar Museum proposal wasn’t 
given serious consideration because the BDHCD preferred a residential development on the site 
(Gunts 1998a). 
The site was re-advertised in April of 1998, and in September of 1998, the City awarded 
the project to Metroventures.  Metroventures proposed to build middle-income housing for 
employees working nearby at the University of Maryland at Baltimore, the University of 
Maryland Medical Center, and Baltimore City.  Metroventures is a twelve-year-old Columbia, 
Maryland based real estate development firm and one of the largest most successful African 
American owned development companies in the country.  This new developer changed the 
project name from Barre Station to Scotts Landing and finally to Camden Crossing to underscore 
the community’s proximity to the stadiums and the rest of downtown and to show that a new 
team is involved in the development (Gunts 1999). 
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At the time of sale, the property was assessed by a private independent assessor at 
between $339,000 (Hernandez 2000) and $450,000 (Penn 2000).   The land disposition 
agreement, i.e.,  contract of sale, has been approved by the City Board of Estimates, and the 
developer had 18 months after November 1999 to complete the contract.  After May of 2001, the 
contract could either be voided or extended.  The agreed upon sales price for the land is $15,000 
(Hernandez 2000). 
The currently proposed housing units start in the mid-$100,000s for three story homes 
with 1,800 sq. ft. of living space and a garage.  The proposal includes 3 bedroom, 2 ½ 
bathrooms, with a monthly mortgage payment about $800 to $1,000.  The annual household 
income needed to purchase one of the homes is about $42,000.  The Baltimore Sun reported on 
May 16, 1999, that Metroventures would start construction at the end of 1999 on the “largest 
piece of land available for residential construction near downtown Baltimore” (Gunts 1999).  
Nations Bank has agreed to provide the construction financing. 
By July1999, Metroventures application to the Voluntary Cleanup Program and their 
request for inculpable status was accepted by the MDE (Metz 1999).  The developer was seeking 
“inculpable status” which offer them legal protection in the event the future contamination or 
repercussions for existing contamination are exposed.   But by February of 2001, Metroventures 
had not received a letter of NFA, in part because there appears to be continued confusion over 
whether Metroventures has submitted an acceptable “Response Action Plan”(RAP) - a plan for 
dealing with remaining contamination.  On May 18, 2000, Metroventures indicated that they 
were under the impression that a RAP had been submitted.  However, a July 11, 2000 memo 
from MDE to Metroventures claimed that an acceptable RAP had not been submitted (MDE 
2001) and as of June 7, 2002, MDE officials reasserted that Metroventures never submitted a 
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RAP (Kahlbacher 2002).10 
Furthermore, there is confusion over what is an acceptable remediation strategy.  In April 
17, 1997, correspondence, the MDE stated  “that a reasonable alternative work plan would be to 
ensure all exposed soil areas have at least three feet of clean fill for the final grade” (MDE 
2001).  This recommendation was incorporated in all future work plans for the site and was the 
basis for the site development drawings that approved by the developer.  As late as early 2000, 
the MDE confirmed that the three foot clean soil cap with a membrane was an acceptable 
remediation strategy.  However, on July 11, 2000, the Maryland Department of Housing and 
Community Development reports correspondence from MDE denying the adequacy of the soil 
cap method “noting that the remediation plan needs to comply with the current MDE guidelines 
for residential development of brownfield sites.” (Maryland Department of Housing and 
Community Development 2000, p. 2 and 3). 
                                                 
10 Upon reading the draft of this paper, the MDE official said “There is no confusion.  
Metroventures has not submitted a RAP”. 
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Therefore, as late as April 17, 2000, the developer and BDHCD were operating under the 
assumption that the MDE was still requiring the replacement of two feet to three feet of top soil 
over a membrane to remediate the PAHs found on the property during the 1997 tests.11 
                                                 
11  Metroventures proposed a plan to use tax revenues from first phase of development to 
clean up and pay for further site preparation expenses.  Approval for this process, called a  
“Certificate of Participation” was denied by the MDE.  
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At a December 13, 2000 meeting, the MDE refined their policy and asked the developer 
to bury the contaminated portions of the site under parking lots or commercial space. This would 
leave 80% of the site in residential space, with the remaining 20% in common parking or 
commercial development.  The developer responded with a proposal to cap the backyards of all 
residences with four inches of concrete, claiming this will add $400,000 to the total cost.  MDE’s 
objection to the concrete proposal is that with third party ownership there will be nothing to 
prevent owners from disrupting the paving in their yards and coming in contact with 
contaminated soil (MDE 2001, p. 6).12   Metroventures objects to the transfer of 20% of the site 
to commercial use, because market studies indicate no demand for additional commercial 
activity in this neighborhood.  In fact, existing and better located commercial activity at Mt. 
Clare is not doing well economically (Paull 2001).  Metroventures objects to MDE’s proposal 
for communal parking because parking would not contribute sufficiently to the project’s bottom 
line.  A ground breaking scheduled for April 1, 2001 passed with no action.   
Rather than comply with MDE requirements, Metroventures pulled out of the Voluntary 
Cleanup Program in January of 2002.  To cope with the environmental issues on site, 
Metroventures will rely on the 1997 NFA letter and has proposed deed restrictions that notify 
each home purchaser of the contamination issues on the site and forbids digging more than two 
                                                 
12Some charge as well, that current MDE officials are setting clean -up standards too 
high, that there is little science to back it up, and that a sophisticated site assessment would 
demonstrative that the MDE is overly protective and setting standards so high as to prohibit the 
redevelopment of any brownfield sites for residential use. 
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feet into the three feet of new fill.  A homeowners association will inspect and enforce the 
covenants (Metroventures, Declaration of Deed Restrictions 2002).  Key to this new 
Metroventures approach, is the fact that the lender has agreed to back the project even without a 
NFA letter from the State’s Voluntary Cleanup Program.  According to Suzanne Graham this 
approach has been piloted in brownfield redevelopment projects in Philadelphia.  Moreover, the 
three feet of fill and the proposed covenents would make this site safer than most in the City. 
Metroventure’s most recent timetable calls for a ground breaking in the summer of 2002 
(Graham, Nelson and Powell, 2002).   Inspite of the delays and obstacles, it is too early to call 
the Camden Crossing project a failure.  Metroventures continues to remain committed to the 
project and confident of success.. 
 
The Highland Marine Terminal 
The City of Baltimore and State of Maryland, Department of the Environment (MDE) 
consider Highland Marine Terminal (HMT) a model brownfields redevelopment  project.  HMT 
is a profitable, privately initiated project, subsidized by the State of Maryland and the City of 
Baltimore.  The 32 acre site is located in the heart of Southeast Baltimore’s port industrial 
district.  
American Smelting and Refining Co., a copper processing plant operated on the site from 
the early 1900s to 1977.  They left behind metal contamination that was remediated with the help 
of a State of Maryland subsidized loan, a loan guarantee, and a letter of “No Further Action” and 
$40,000 in grants from the City of Baltimore.  The redeveloped site currently has 1 million sq. ft 
of fully leased warehouse and office space. 
The Site and Developer 
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The site is at 1601 South Highland Ave, in the heart of Baltimore’s port related industrial 
area.  The developer, P.F. Obrecht and sons, is an experienced Baltimore developer, and they 
currently own and manage about 2 million sq. ft. of commercial space, much of it in the city 
limits of Baltimore13.   At the time of project initiation in 1995 and up to today, low-cost 
warehouse space near the port is in short supply.  After tests determined the site “wasn’t 
glowing” Obrecht and his partners concluded the property was worth the risk (Kline 1996).  This 
was one of the City’s first brownfield projects, and market demand and State and City support 
compensated for the risks associated with owning a contaminated parcel. 
 
Environmental History 
American Smelting and Refining Co. (ASARCO) processed copper on the site beginning 
in the early 1900s.  ASARCO moved out in 1977 and the property was sold to Parker Realty 
Company.   Petroleum Fuel and Terminal Service Corp bought the property from Parker in 1981 
and the Obrechts purchased the property in 1995.  In the years after ASARCO ceased 
production, the property sat partially vacant and scavengers removed everything from the site 
that was of value.  In 1995, the property was covered with rusting metal warehouse roofs and 
piles of trash. Sewage flowed straight into the harbor. 
Prior to their 1995 purchase, Obrecht consultants conducted a Site Characterization and 
Remediation Feasibility Study (Kozema 1995).  The report indicated primary site contamination 
 from the metal used in the refining and processing of various ores during the ASARCO years.  
Lead, arsenic, antimony, beryllium, copper, nickel, silver, and selenium levels exceeded the U.S. 
                                                 
13In 1998, they owned twice this number, before putting 50% of their holdings up for sale 
in 1998 (Harrison 1998).  
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Environmental Protection Agency standards, but it was the nickel, silver, and selenium levels 
that were of major concern (Kozera 1995).   
With the agreement of MDE, the developers used a soil fixation method to resolve the 
contamination problems.  A 5" layer of contaminated soil over 2 ½ acres was dug up and mixed 
with Portland cement via a pug-mill to achieve a soil/cement mixture.  Approximately 4,000 
cubic yards of material were processed and placed in the eastern portion of the property and 
capped with asphalt.  Obrecht agreed to monitoring of the treated soil every six months for a 
period of two years after treatment; and quarterly monitoring of ground water for five years.   
Asbestos, lead paint and PCBs were removed from buildings, and the underground sewage 
system was rerouted to prevent sewage from pouring into the harbor ( Kline 1996, Kozera 1996, 
Obrecht 2000, MDE 1997).   The agreement between the Obrechts and MDE was finalized in 
November of 1995 and the soil fixation and capping of the contaminate soil was completed in 
September 1996.  Aside from the environmental cleanup, the Obrechts had to remove 250 truck 
loads of trash and raze obsolete buildings.   
 
Redevelopment History 
The Obrecht company paid $5 mill to buy the land and spent an additional $7 mill to 
develop the parcel.  The developer received a $20,000 grant from the City of Baltimore to 
conduct environmental tests and another $20,000 from Maryland Board of Public Works to 
begin renovations (Daily Record 1996).  One-half of the $11.5 million project financing came 
from a single private investor.  Mercantile bank provided another $5 million, of which $3.5 was 
guaranteed by the state.  Another $1 million was put in by the State of Maryland in low interest, 
5.64% loans.  Clean up costs totaled $1 mill. 
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  This was the State of Maryland’s first brownfield project, initiated and completed 
before the State’s 1997 Voluntary cleanup law.  The developer received a state issued “No 
Further Action (NFA) letter, releasing them from liability, once the agreed upon cleanup 
standard had been reached.   Even with the “NFA” letter it would have been difficult if not 
impossible to get private financing without the state loan guarantee.  The developer approached 
seven banks and were turned down by six (Tom Obrecht 2000).  Approximately 100,000 sq. ft. 
of buildings were razed and replaced.  Other buildings were renovated, and others are original.  
The current charge for warehouse space is from $2.75 to $4.00 per sq. ft, with the higher price 
for the space in the newer buildings. 
By November, 1996, the project was 95% pre-leased, including 733,000 sq. ft. of space 
and seven acres of outside storage (Bowie 1996).  Today the project is currently fully leased 
(Tom Obrecht 2000). 
 
Crown, Cork and Seal 
Crown, Cork and Seal is a privately financed brownfield redevelopment project, initiated 
by Wells and Tom Obrecht.  Once, a machinery manufacturer, making bottling and canning 
equipment, Crown, Cork, and Seal sold out to a group of employees, Crown Simplimatics, who 
then phased out the Baltimore production altogether in January of 1998.  The Obrechts took 
ownership in January of 2000 and, without subsidy, conducted the environmental testing and 
cleanup to the Maryland Department of the Environment’s standards.  The current warehouse 





The Obrechts hired for Phase I and Phase II testing early in the purchase negotiations.  
Tests indicated the site was contaminated with PCBs - from a leaking transformer and ballasts, 
metals, solvents, oil and asbestos.  Obrecht did not want to take title of the property before he 
had legal protection.  Therefore he negotiated with the seller for help with remediation, and 
cleanup of the PCBs and decontamination was carried out jointly by the seller and purchaser 
before the land changed title and before entrance into the MDE Voluntary Cleanup Program. 
As new owners of a contaminated site, the Obrechts determined that if they purchased the 
un-remediated land, applied to the MDE’s Voluntary Cleanup Program, submitted the required 
“Remediation Action Plan” (RAP) for approval, conducted the site cleanup, and then applied for 
the NFA letter the process would have taken 8 months to a year.   Delays are the result of the 
need for posting of signs, public meetings, and negotiations over cleanup standards in the RAP 
process.  The advantage of cleanup with the cooperation of the existing owner was that the 
Obrechts could skip the RAP phase and apply directly to the Voluntary Cleanup Program for a 
NFA letter. 
After the cleanup and taking title to the land, the Obrechts applied to the State of 
Maryland’s Voluntary Clean Program and received the NFA letter in four months.   Both 
remediation and receipt of the “No Further Action” letter took between six to eight months.  
Clean up costs totaled about $150,000 (Wells Obrecht, May 28 and June 14, 2002).. 
 
Development History 
The site is located in the Canton industrial area, near the port of Baltimore.  The 
profitability of the nearby Highland Marine Terminal was a factor in making Crown, Cork and 
Seal an attractive development project. The site totals approximately sixteen acres, with a 
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350,000 square foot building footprint.  Fifty sq. ft. is in office space and 270 sq. ft. in 
warehouse space.  
The Obrechts purchased the property for $4.3 million, and spent $3.5 on renovations.  
The financing was provided by a banker accustomed to dealing with historically industrial 
properties.  No government subsidies were involved.  Currently, their warehouse space is at full 
occupancy.  According to both Tom and Wells Obrecht, “without the States brownfield program 
we would not have done it.  The environmental issues would have deterred us, the project would 




Comparing the successful HMT and Crown, Cork, and Seal projects with the troubled  
Camden Crossing project puts some of the barriers as well as some of the conditions responsible 
for success in relief.  Market, environmental, regulatory, administrative, and political risk all 
plays a role in brownfield redevelopment outcomes.  
First, HMT and Crown, Cork, and Seal faced a more certain market for their final 
product.  In Baltimore, there is a strong market for port-related warehouse space.   In 
comparison, Southwest Baltimore’s residential housing market is fragile.   In the  mid 1990s, the 
vacancy rate for warehouse space was running about 4% lower in Southeast Baltimore than in 
the Baltimore suburbs (Howland and Dubroff 1997).  In contrast, current estimates are that there 
are 12,259 abandoned houses and 24,259 additional unoccupied houses (well kept but without 
tenants) in Baltimore and 1,152 abandoned and an additional 1,483 unoccupied houses in the 
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Southwest area of the City (McMahon 2001).14  This housing surplus in City and the 
neighborhoods surrounding Camden Crossing undermines the profitability of a new residential 
development and makes it even harder to justify the climbing cleanup costs and outlays resulting 
from development delays.  
Second and importantly, HMT and Crown, Cork and Seal retained the same industrial to 
industrial use, whereas Camden Crossing is shifting from an industrial to residential use.  A 
switch to residential use increased the project risk.  An invariant industrial use means that the 
land does not have to be as clean and public officials are not as jittery over the appropriate clean-
up standards and methods.  In the case of both HMT and Crown, Cork, and Seal, MDE officials 
quickly accepted the proposed clean-up levels and strategy.  In Camden Crossing, where 
children may come into contact with the soil, MDE officials have been less precise about clean-
up remedies, and in fact have modified and tightened the standards mid-course.  An added 
advantage for HMT and Crown, Cork and Seal is that the sites are not proximate to residential 
areas, which would have added to government concerns over cleanup standards, future liability 
risks, and citizen protests which can cause delays.  As a result, the approval process was quicker 
and cleanup standards less stringent for HMT and Crown, Cork, and Seal than for Camden 
Crossing. 
Third, the character and level of contamination also influences the risk and probability 
of success.  The higher costs at Camden Crossing are not only due to the planned residential end 
                                                 




use.  At Camden Crossing, in addition to toxic contaminates, planners ran into unexpected 
underground infrastructure that has proved costly to remove.  The costs of cleanup are already 6 
times higher at the Camden Crossing Site than the HMT site, and 40 times higher at Camden 
Crossing than Crown, Cork, and Seal.  Contamination remediation at Crown, Cork, and Seal was 
$150,000 and was $1 million at HMT.  Cleanup costs at Camden Crossing have topped $6 
million and estimates are that another $3.5 million is needed to finish the job.  Higher cleanup 
costs require either greater public subsidies or higher private profitability.  Where the 
remediation expenditures come from public subsidies, especially in the form of direct subsidies 
rather than loan guarantees, the project will attract tax payer attention, scrutiny and potential 
resistance.  In Camden Crossing, public officials are finding it difficult to justify larger subsidies 
than they have already invested and residential market demand doesn’t seem to justify additional 
private costs. 
Fourth, the local experience of the developer plays a role in project success.  The HMT 
and Crown, Cork, and Seal developers are familiar with the local market.  Both are Obrecht 
projects and the Obrecht Company has a long history of developing and owning land in the 
Canton and Baltimore industrial land market.  In contrast, both Ryland Homes and 
Metroventures, the first and second developers for Camden Crossing, are novice central city 
developers and new to the Baltimore market.  Lack of confidence in the project’s profitability 
contributed to Ryland’s pullout. 
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Fifth, all delays in implementation add to the legal and administrative risks.  The 
Crown, Cork and Seal project finished within the year and the HMT project occurred, start to 
finish, within a three-year period..  Thus these projects began and ended with essentially the 
same MDE and City staff.  The Obrechts, therefore, avoided changes in policy that can occur 
when there are changes public sector staff.  In contrast, the Barre Station /Camden Crossing 
project has been in the works for approximately nine years, and during this time, key MDE staff 
departed and new staff - with different levels of risk averseness - have arrived.  Consequently, 
the current Camden Crossing developers are now facing cleanup standards and requirements 
different from those that existed when they took on the project. 
Sixth, sites near residential communities face greater political barriers and risks.  In the 
case of Camden Crossing, which is located in the midst of existing residential neighborhoods 
and a commercial district, citizen groups lobbied for uses that served their interests.  Citizen 
input led city officials to exclude competing commercial activities and favor adding clientele for 
existing businesses, i.e. residential.  A pure market assessment might have suggested another 
land use.  In the cases of HMT and Crown, Cork and Seal, the surrounding industrial uses and 




Finally, privately initiated projects are more likely to be successful than projects that are 
initiated by public agencies.  This not a critique of the public-sector’s initiation of brownfield 
redevelopment efforts, but only a comment about which types of projects are more easily 
implemented.  It is, however, completely appropriate for the City to initiate the more difficult, 
riskier, less profitable projects that the private sector will not tackle alone.  In the Camden 
Crossing case, the site remained idle and vacant for seven years with no interested buyers on the 
horizon.  This vacant eight-acre parcel created a major eyesore for the surrounding residential 
and commercial community.  HMT and Crown, Cork, and Seal sat on the market for less than a 
year and private developers initiated the projects after they saw the possibility for profitability. 
 In summary, market, environmental, legal and administrative, and political risks play a 
role in brownfield redevelopment successes and obstacles.  The three cases examined here 
highlight a number of lessons for successful brownfield development.  First, when the ultimate 
land use is determined solely by market profitability, as was the case for HMT and Crown, Cork 
and Seal, risks are smaller.  When a project calls for a transfer from a contaminated industrial use 
to a residential use, redevelopment is more costly than an industrial to industrial reuse.  Where a 
residential use is proposed, the economic conditions have to be more favorable to justify the 
higher cleanup costs.  Moreover,  it is important for private developers and city officials to move 
quickly to avoid changes in city and state agency personnel, which can cause cleanup standards 
and strategies to become a moving target.  Finally, the more complex the pollution, the more 
favorable a project’s social and private economics have to be to compensate for the risk of 
unsuspected additional cleanup costs.   In the case of Camden Crossing, the project has all four 





Baltimore Sun, 1994, “Ryland in Pigtown,”  April 26. 
 
Bowie, Liz, 1996, “Cleanup of terminal opens possibilities”, Baltimore Sun, November 5. 
 
Collins, Richard, (2002) Director Waste Management Administration, Maryland 
Department of the Environment, personal interview, May 28. 
 
The Daily Record, 1996, “Obrecht gets $20K grant to renovate brownfields site”, July 11. 
 
The Daily Record, 1997, “After long delay, construction near for Pigtown housing,” 
January 17. 
 
Environmental Resources Management, 2002, Phase I Environmental Site Assessment 
Report and Summary of Phase II Investigations for Camden Crossing, Baltimore, Maryland, 
April 4. 
 
Graham, Suzanne, 1999, Vice President Metroventures, memo with enclosure to Shari 
Wilson, Maryland Department of the Environment, Re:  Koppers Site - Remediation Status, 
January 27. 
 
Graham, Suzanne, 2002, Vice President Metroventures, telephone interview, May 17. 
 
Grahan, Suzanne, Vice President Metroventures; Ronald Nelson, Lawyer for 
Metroventures and President of Nelson and Associations; and Michael Powell, Environmental 
Consultant and Chair of Environmental and Energy Law Department, Gordon and Fineblatt, 
2002, conference telephone interview, June 14. 
 
Gunts, Edward, 1998a, “City eyes proposal for Barre Station”, Baltimore Sun, June 2.. 
 
Gunts, Edward, 1998b, “Company to build housing East of B & O Museum,” Baltimore 
Sun, September 1. 
 
Gunts, Edward, 1999,  “A Camden to call home,” Baltimore Sun, Sunday, May 16, p. K1. 
 
Hernandez, Angelo, 2000, Economic Development Officer, Land Acquisition/Disposition 
Section, Baltimore Department of Housing and Community Development, Baltimore City, 
personal interview on September 13, and telephone interview on November 19. 
 
Harrison, Dave, 1998, “Obrecht & Son selling other half of company”, Baltimore 
Business Journal, June, 5. 
 
Howland, Marie and Martin Dubroff, 1997,  The Demand for Industrial/Flex Warehouse 
 
 29 
Space in Southeast Baltimore, unpublished paper, Urban Studies and Planning Program, 
University of Maryland, November 15. 
 
Kalbacher, Karl, (2002) Administrator, Environmental Restoration and Redevelopment 
Program, Waste Management Administration, Maryland Department of the Environment, 
personal interview, May 28.  
 
Kalbacher, Karl, (2002) Administrator, Environmental Restoration and Redevelopment 
Program, Waste Management Administration, Maryland Department of the Environment, 
telephone interview, June 7.  
 
Karimian, Shawn, 2000, Director, Baltimore Department of Housing and Community 
Development, Baltimore City, Department of Construction, personal interview, September 13. 
 
Klein, Alec, 1998, “Developers back out of Koppers deal,” Baltimore Sun, March 24. 
 
Kline, Alan, 1996,  “Developers taking risk on former copper refinery,” Baltimore 
Business Journal, October 21. 
 
Kozera, D.W. 1995, Environmental Site Characterization and Remedation Feasibility 
Study, Pistorio Property, 1601 South Highland Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland, September 5. 
 
Kozera, D.W. 1996, Pistorio Property, Soil Stabilization Bench Study, 1601 South 
Highland Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland, Contract Number 95014, May 10. 
 
McMahon, Patrick, 2001, “Personal memo to Marie Howland on OSOSW and Citywide 
Abandonment,” February 8, Neighborhood Design Center, Baltimore, Maryland.. 
 
McCabe, Alec, 1995, “City neighborhood pins hopes on revitalization,” Baltimore Sun. 
 
Maryland Department of the Environment, 1996, Waste Management Administration, 
“Brownfields Assessment, Parkin Street Site, Baltimore, Maryland,” December. 
 
Maryland Department of the Environment, 1997, A Brownfields Success Story, April 18. 
 
Maryland Department of the Environment. 2001, “Barre Station/Camden Crossing 
Project Chronology,” January. 
 
Maryland of Department Housing and Community Development, 2000, “memo to Art 
Ray, Maryland Department of the Environment from Michelle Wright, Maryland DHCD,”  
December 20. 
 




Metz, James, 1999, Chief, Voluntary Cleanup/Brownfields Division, memo to Olusola O. 
Seriko, President, Metroventures/USA Inc., July 15. 
 
Mirabella, Lorraine, 1994a, “Developers offer plans for vacant lot in Pigtown” Baltimore 
Sun, January 16. 
 
Mirabella, Lorraine, 1994b, “Pigtown site to get 113 townhouses,” Baltimore Sun, April 
22. 
 
Mirabella, Lorraine, 1995, “Developers offer plans for vacant lot in Pigtown,” Baltimore 
Sun, January, 1, p. L1. 
 
Mirabella, Lorraine, 1996, “Site work delayed at townhome project,” Baltimore Sun, 
March 8, p. C1. 
 
Nubgart, Robert, 1998, “Clean’ polluted site too risky,” Baltimore Sun, March 29, p. L1. 
 
Obrecht, Tom, 2000, telephone interview, September 14. 
 
Obrecht, Wells, 2001, telephone interview, February 9. 
 
Obrecht, Wells, 2002, personal interview, May 28. 
 
Obrecht, Wells, 2002 telephone interview, June 6. 
 
Paull, Evans, 2001, Brownfields Coordinator, Baltimore Development Corporation, 
telephone interview,  January 19. 
 
Penn, Ivan, 2000, “Board of Estimates Oks first payment for townhouse development on 
west side; $3.5 million deal approved over comptrollers advice,” Baltimore Sun, January 20. 
 
Spotts, Stevens and McCoy, Inc. Environmental Assessment Report at 250 Scott St., 
Baltimore, Maryland for Department of Housing and Community Development, Baltimore, 
Maryland. February 14, 1992. 
 
Russ, Tom 2000, Spotts, Stevens and McCoy, Personal interview, November 11. 
 
The Washington Post, (2002),  May 9, B1. 
   
Wheeler, Timothy, 1997, “Brownfields bill to help reuse old industrial sites,” Baltimore 
Sun, February 2.   
 
 
 
 
 31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 32 
 
 
 
 33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 34 
